In this paper, we generalize the basic notions and results of Dempster-Shafer theory from predicates to formal concepts. Results include the representation of conceptual belief functions as inner measures of suitable probability functions, and a Dempster-Shafer rule of combination on belief functions on formal concepts.
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(epistemic) logical perspective on approximation spaces [5, 11, 15, 17] , and also to the study of several types of algebraic structures arising from and generalizing approximation spaces [8, 18, 19] .
Also on the basis of algebraic and logical insights, in [1] , a methodology is introduced to generalize Rough Set eory from sets to formal concepts, the central structures in the field of Formal Concept Analysis [6] , and in [9, 10] , the proof-theoretic aspects of this generalization are explored. Using these insights and results, and in particular building on cf. [1, Section 7.3] in the present paper we propose a generalization of Dempster-Shafer theory to formal concepts.
e starting point of our proposal is an order-theoretic analysis of the toggle between finite probability spaces and belief functions on finite sets, with a particular focus on [5, eorem 3.3] .
e insights gained from this analysis are then put to use to define a formal framework of belief functions on (finite) formal contexts (cf. Definition 3.1), and (finite) conceptual probability spaces (i.e. probability spaces based on (finite) formal contexts, cf. Definition 3.3). In this framework, we show that belief functions on finite formal contexts can be represented as inner measures of some conceptual probability spaces. We define a rule of combination of belief functions on formal contexts, and illustrate the behaviour of this framework on some case studies involving decisionmaking problems based on classification.
is preliminary exploration points towards the possibility of extending the scope of an important tool for reasoning and decision-making under uncertainty to all areas of application of Formal Concept Analysis, and to categorization problems in particular.
ORDER-THEORETIC ANALYSIS
In this section, we collect preliminaries on belief and plausibility functions on sets, finite probability spaces, and develop an order theoretic analysis of these notions which leads to an algebraic reformulation of [5, eorem 3.3] .
Belief, plausibility and mass functions. A belief function on a set S is a map bel : P(S) → [0, 1] such that bel(S) = 1, and for every n ∈ N,
A plausibility function on S is a map pl : P(S) → [0, 1] such that pl(S) = 1, and for every n ∈ N,
Belief and plausibility functions on sets are interchangeable notions: for every belief function bel as above, the assignment X → 1 − bel(X ) defines a plausibility function on S, and for every plausibility function pl as above, the assignment X → 1 − pl(X ) defines a belief function on S. A mass function on a set S is a map m :
On finite sets, belief (resp. plausibility) functions and mass functions are interchangeable notions: any mass function m as above induces the belief function bel m :
1:3 and conversely, any belief function bel as above induces the mass function m bel :
A probability space is a structure X = (S, A, µ) where S is a nonempty (finite) set, A is a σ -algebra of subsets of S, and µ : A → [0, 1] is a countably additive probability measure. Let e : A ֒→ P(S) denote the natural embedding of A into the powerset algebra of S. Any µ as above induces the inner and outer measures µ * , µ * : P(S) → [0, 1], respectively defined as
By construction, µ * (e(b)) = µ(b) = µ * (e(b)) for every b ∈ A and µ * (Z ) = 1 − µ * (Z ) for every Z ⊆ S. Moreover, for every probability space X = (S, A, µ), the inner (resp. outer) measure induced by µ is a belief (resp. plausibility) function on S (cf. [5, Proposition 3.1]).
Order-theoretic analysis. In a finite probability space X as above, the natural embedding e : A ֒→ P(S) is a complete la ice homomorphism (in fact it is a complete Boolean algebra homomorphism, but in the context of Boolean algebras, these two notions collapse). Hence, the right and le adjoints of e exist, denoted ι, γ : P(S) ։ A respectively, and defined as
For every finite probability space X = (S, A, µ), and every Y ∈ P(S),
P . We only show the first identity. From the definitions of µ * , ι and the additivity of µ, we get: µ * (Y ) = {µ(a) | a ∈ A and e(a) ⊆ Y } = µ( {a | a ∈ A and e(a)
e next proposition is an algebraic reformulation of [5, eorem 3.3] . T 2.2. For any belief function bel : P(S) → [0, 1] on a finite set S there exists a finite probability space X = (S ′ , A, µ), and a Boolean algebra embedding h : P(S) ֒→ P(S ′ ) such that bel(X ) = µ * (h(X )).
P
. Since S ′ is finite, as discussed above we can assume that bel arises from a mass function m on P(S). We let S ′ := {(X , u) | X ⊆ S and u ∈ X }, and let A be the Boolean subalgebra of P(S ′ ) generated by {X * | X ∈ P(S)}, where X * := {(X , u) | u ∈ X } for every X ∈ P(S). Notice that, for any X , Y ∈ P(S), if X Y , then X * ∩ Y * = . Hence, we define the probability measure µ : A → [0, 1] by le ing µ(X * ) := m(X ) for any X ∈ P(S), and then extending it by additivity to the whole domain of A. Let h : P(S) → P(S ′ ) be defined by the assignment h(X ) := {(Y , u) ∈ S ′ | u ∈ X }. It is routine to check that h is an injective Boolean algebra homomorphism. Finally, let X ∈ P(S), and let us show that µ * (h(X )) = bel(X ). Since the structures are finite, µ * (h(X )) = µ(W ) where W := {Y * | Y * ⊆ h(X )}. Hence, noticing that Y * ⊆ h(X ) iff Y ⊆ X , and recalling that any two distinct generators are disjoint,
CONCEPTUAL DS-STRUCTURES AND CONCEPTUAL PROBABILITY SPACES 3.1 Preliminaries and definitions
Formal contexts and their concept la ices. A formal context [6] , or polarity, is a structure P = (A, X , I ) such that A and X are sets, and I ⊆ A × X is a binary relation. Formal contexts can be thought of as abstract representations of databases, where elements of A and X represent objects and features, respectively, and the relation I records whether a given object has a given feature.
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Every formal context as above induces maps (·) ↑ : P(A) → P(X ) and (·) ↓ : P(X ) → P(A), respectively defined by the assignments
is intuitively understood as the extension of the concept c, while the set of features ([c]) is understood as its intension. e set L(P) of the formal concepts of P can be partially ordered as follows:
With this order, L(P) is a complete la ice, the concept la ice P + of P. As is well known, any complete la ice L is isomorphic to the concept la ice P + of some formal context P. A formal context P is finite if its associated concept la ice P + is a finite la ice. 1
Conceptual DS-structures and conceptual probability spaces. e notions of DS-structures and probability spaces can be generalized from sets to polarities as follows.
A conceptual DS-structure is a tuple D = (P, m) such that P is finite formal context, and m is a mass function on P.
Notice that for a formal context P = (A, X , I ), the bo om element of
Hence, the extension of ⊥ might in some cases be nonempty. If so, it is implausible to require the mass of ⊥ to always be zero. is explains the requirement that m(⊥) = 0 applies only if
Belief and plausibility functions arise from conceptual DS-structures as follows. 
Definition 3.3. A conceptual probability space is a structure X = (P, A, µ) where P is a finite formal context, A is a σ -algebra of concepts of P, i.e. a la ice embedding e : A ֒→ P + exists of A into the concept la ice of P, and µ : A → [0, 1] is a countably additive probability measure.
In any conceptual probability space X as above, the embedding e : A ֒→ P + is a complete la ice homomorphism, and hence, similarly to the Boolean se ing, the right and le adjoints of e exist, denoted ι, γ : P + ։ A respectively, and defined as ι(c) := {a ∈ A | e(a) ≤ c} and γ (c) := {a ∈ A | c ≤ e(a)}.
Using these maps, we can define the inner and outer measures µ * , µ * : P + → [0, 1] as follows: for every c ∈ P + , µ * (c) = µ(ι(c)) and µ * (c) = µ(γ (c)).
3.2 Representing conceptual DS-structures as conceptual probability spaces e aim of this section is to prove the following T 3.4. For any conceptual DS-structure D = (P, m) there exists a finite conceptual probability space X = (P ′ , A, µ), and a meet-preserving embedding h : P + ֒→ P ′+ such that bel m (c) = µ * (h(c)) and pl m (c) = µ * (h(c)).
We proceed via a series of lemmas. Let P = (A, X , I ) be a finite formal context and P + be its la ice of concepts. We can assume without loss of generality that X ↓ = . We define the polarity P ′ = (A ′ , X ′ , I ′ ) as follows:
} is the extension of a formal concept.
e lemma above implies that c * ∈ P ′+ . Let A be the sub join-semila ice of P ′+ join-generated by {c * | c ∈ P + }. 
We can thus define the map µ : A → [0, 1] first on the generators of A, by le ing µ(c * ) = m(c) for every c ∈ P + , and uniquely extend it to a measure on A. Let e : A ֒→ P ′+ be the natural embedding. By construction, e is a la ice homomorphism, hence the right and le adjoint of e exist, denoted ι and γ , respectively.
Let us define the map h : P + ֒→ P ′+ as follows: for every c ∈ P + ,
In the two lemmas below we show that h is indeed well defined:
Right to le inclusion: 
9. e map h defined above is a meet-preserving embedding.
. Now, let us show that h is meet-preserving:
Let us show that bel(c) = µ * (h(c)) for every c ∈ P + . Since A is an atomic Boolean algebra, every element is equal to the join of the atoms below it. Furthermore, notice that d ≤ c if and only if d * ≤ h(c). erefore, we have:
(because each a ∈ A is equal to the join of the atoms below it)
Finally, let us show that pl(c) = µ * (h(c)) for every c ∈ P + . Let U ⊆ P + , c ∈ P + and
e last equality holds because A is a Boolean algebra. Hence, we have:
(because each a ∈ A is equal to the join of the atoms d * below it)
is concludes the proof of eorem 3.4.
Combination of evidence
Let P = (A, X , I ) be a finite formal context and m 1 , m 2 be two mass functions on P. We build the combined mass function m 1⊕2 following Dempster-Shafer's procedure. If
] ∅} 0, then the combined mass function m 1⊕2 is defined as follows:
It is straightforward to verify that m 1⊕2 is a mass function on P.
EXAMPLE: CATEGORIZATION THEORY
In the present section, we discuss how the basic tools of Dempster-Shafer theory on formal contexts and their associated concept la ices introduced in the previous sections can be applied to the formalization of categorization decisions in various areas. e application we propose here builds on [2, 3] , where formal contexts are regarded as abstract representations of databases (e.g. of market products and their relevant features) and their associated formal concepts as categories, each admi ing both an extensional characterization (in terms of the objects that are members of the given category) and an intensional characterization (in terms of the features that are part of the description of the given category).
Music databases. Consider the problem of categorizing a given song S on the base of user-inputs. e categorization procedure consists in aggregating the replies of users to a questionnaire about S. e questionnaire makes reference to the objects of a database, which, for the sake of simplicity, we represent as the following polarity P = (A, X , I ), with A = {a, b, c} a given set of songs (a = A-haTake on me, b = Beyonce -Crazy in love, c = Marvin Gaye -Sexual healing) and X = {w, x, , z} a set of relevant features: w = keyboards, x = upbeat tempo, = gospel-trained singers, z= whispering voices.
e questionnaire makes also reference to the (names of) the categories-as-formal-concepts arising from P, i.e. the elements of the following la ice C:
Specifically, the questionnaire contains statements of the following types:
• "Song S is similar to song e", for e ∈ A;
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• "Song S belongs to category C", for C ∈ C.
Each user chooses one or more such statements and grades it on the following scale: ree users give the following responses:
• User 1: "Song S is similar to a", graded 0.2.
• User 2: "Song S is similar to a" graded 0.6, and "Song S is similar to b" graded 0.6, and "Song S belongs to E-Pop" graded 0, and "Song S belongs to Pop-R&B" graded 0.
• User 3: "Song S belongs to Pop-R&B" graded 0.2 and "Song S belongs to Funk" graded 0. 6 and "Song S belongs to category ⊥" graded 0.
e pieces of evidence. e users' responses constitute three pieces of evidence that we will represent as mass functions m : C → [0, 1], to each of which we can then associate belief and plausibility functions as follows: for any c ∈ C,
Notice that, in order for the evidence to represent a mass and not a belief, it needs to specify the probability that an object is in a category without being in any of its subcategories.
• To model User 1's response, we need a mass function that assigns mass 0.2 to the smallest category containing the song a, that is, the category that most accurately describes the song a. is category is the category the extension of which is the closure of the singleton {a}. In our example, this category is E-Pop = (a, wx). Analysis of the result. Dempster's rule of combination treats every user's piece of evidence as a constraint for other users' pieces of evidence. For example, if User 1 is reports that S is definitely a Pop song (m 1 (Pop) = 1) and User 2 that S is definitely an R&B song (m 2 (R&B) = 1), then the corresponding aggregated mass assignments yields m 1⊕2 (Pop-R&B) = 1, suggesting that S can be definitely categorized as a member of the greatest common subcategory of Pop and R&B.
Notice that, in the example above, individual mass values for Funk and Pop are identical, hence one cannot a priori tell which category best describes song S. However, the aggregated mass function assigns Funk a greater value than Pop. Hence, combining evidence provides us with more information and allows for a more accurate categorization of the given song S.
Notice also that m 1 (⊤) = 0.8 is a much higher value than m 2 (⊤) and m 3 (⊤). Saying that song S belongs to ⊤ provides the least accurate categorization of S, which implies that User 1's response has the smallest impact on the combined evidence. Indeed, when combining mass functions m 1 and m 2 , if one of them, say m 2 , is such that m 2 (⊤) = 1, then then the combined mass function m 1⊕2 coincides with m 1 , that is, m 2 provides no information.
Notice that if m i (⊤) = 0 for any i = 1, 2, 3 then m 1⊕2⊕3 (⊤) = 0. Indeed, if C is any category for which some mass function m satisfies m(C ′ ) = 0, for all C ′ ≥ C, then, on combining it with any other mass function, the combined mass function m ′ will also satisfy m ′ (C ′ ) = 0 for all C ′ ≥ C.
is shows that categorization based on combined mass is at least as informative as categorization based on any individual piece of evidence.
Looking at the belief and plausibility functions obtained by combining evidence, one can see that the highest belief and plausibility (while excluding ⊤) are assigned to R&B. is is the case because User 3 provides a more significant piece of evidence than Users 1 and 2 and this piece of evidence supports S being a member of Pop-R&B and Funk. Hence, in the aggregate, the mass values of Pop-R&B and Funk are higher than the mass values of the other categories. e same reasoning explains why the mass value of Pop is higher than that of E-Pop. Since R&B is a supercategory of Pop-R&B and Funk, the value of the combined belief function in R&B turns out to be higher than that of the other categories.
EXAMPLE: PREFERENCE AGGREGATION
In the present section, we develop an example showing how the Dempster-Shafer rule for aggregating mass functions can be usefully applied to also preference aggregation. e scenario. Alice and Bob wish to watch a movie together, and query a movie database by expressing their independent (graded) preferences. e so ware interface interprets their preferences as mass functions on the database (modelled as a formal context), and combines them using the rule of Section 3.3. Case 1. Conflict with no resolution. Alice wishes to watch a romantic comedy and Bob a chainsaw horror movie. e database they are querying, and its associated concept la ice, look as follows:
Towards a logical theory of conceptual evidence. In this paper we have not pursued an explicitly logical approach; however, the structures introduced in Section 3.1 lend themselves naturally as bases for models of an epistemic/probabilistic logic of categories generalizing the epistemic logics for Dempster-Shafer theory introduced in [7, 15] .
Dempster-Shafer theory of concepts and rough concepts. A key intermediate step to concretely pursue the direction indicated in the previous point can be the connection currently emerging between Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) and Rough Set eory (RST) [14] . Indeed, Rough Set eory is a theory in information science which provides a purely qualitative modelling of incomplete information via upper and lower definable approximations of given sets. Instances of these definable approximations arise from outer and inner measures induced by probability measures (cf. [1, Section 7.3] ), which provides a precise way to articulate the affinity between RST and Dempster-Shafer theory. e connections between the two theories have been investigated in the literature already for some time (cf. e.g. [18] ).
e connection between FCA and RST builds on [2, 3] , where a framework based on formal concepts is introduced which serves as generalized Kripke semantics for an epistemic logic of categories. In [1] , it is shown how the basic structures of RST can be represented as special structures based on formal contexts, in a way that 'preserves the embedding', as it were, between the natural modal logics of these structures; in [9] , it is shown how previous proposals for integrating FCA and RST are subsumed by the logic-based proposal of [1] .
